A surprising contact on LinkedIn. An offer of work from a recruiter, most likely a female agent, based in China. The opportunity to make around £20,000 on the side writing a handful of geopolitical reports for a Chinese company containing confidential or “insider” insights. Compensation in digital currency or cash preferred.
It might appear clear, on this telling, that an element about this method would be suspicious. However, China’s powerful Ministry of State Security continues to view it valuable to deploy recruitment consultants to try it – leading MI5 to warn repeatedly about their activity on the internet.
Massive Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
In 2023, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum said Chinese agents were approaching UK citizens on the platform on an unprecedented level, at a frequency of 10,000 over the preceding two and a half years, seeking governmental, industrial, defense and scientific classified information. But a new campaign targeting politicians and parliament has led the spy agency to act again.
A spying alert was distributed on Tuesday via the offices of the Commons speaker and his Lords equivalent: a single slide after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and other operatives to reach out to MPs, lords, their assistants, economic experts, thinktanks – anybody who might become a source.
Intelligence Approach and Legislative Updates
In the curious manner of UK security services, there was no official release of the security advice from the agency or the interior ministry. Yet the agency knew its briefing note would leak once it was emailed out to Westminster. Republishing it in the press helps the general population more easily recognize communications with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the impact of flushing out more information from within parliament, though that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The service wants people in public life to recognize that just because exchanges on professional networks are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are completely safe.
Nor is internal security service understood to have been responding to a particular event in the legislature, though the recent actions does come after the awkward failure of the legal case of a ex-assistant an individual and his friend another person on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of working for the foreign power – a allegation they rejected – but inability to successfully conclude a trial under the now repealed Official Secrets Act led to concerns that British democracy had been left unprotected.
Revised Legislation and China's Long-Term Interests
The law has now been changed, and the security briefing contains a reminder of its successor: “Individuals involved in espionage activity face substantial legal consequences under the National Security Act.” This constitutes a crime if a person engages in behavior that could potentially “materially assist a overseas spy agency”.
An obvious question, though, is what China has to gain. A politician who is not a government minister will have limited knowledge of classified material, and an associate of theirs less so. Yet the Chinese government is also interested in the legislative body: for a time, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s China policy on issues such as Huawei or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Methodological Differences and Ongoing Digital Threats
To a degree there are distinct approaches as well. Autocratic regimes like China’s export information gathering techniques and the scale of its intelligence apparatus is vast, employing three hundred thousand people. A former US official, a US national cyber director under the US administration, commented it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity involved in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is prepared to develop contacts over the long term and sometimes even the intelligence services have struggled to distinguish between legitimate relationships and spying. “Beijing has a low threshold for what information is deemed to be useful,” the minister responsible a government official told parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the government situation may result in an individual quickly marginal turning significant.
Another way to think about the relentless efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the international competition between Beijing and the west at a threshold below the point of outright war. China has stepped up its hacking efforts, with the one campaign infiltration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of countless internet devices.
Chinese authorities is involved in relentless efforts to identify secret informants on UK politics online because it wants to be provocative, to demonstrate influence and because it has the capability.